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INTRODUCTION

Few rights in this country are more protected than the right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The historical purpose
of the Fourth Amendment' demonstrates the First Congress's emt ACLU News Wire, Virtual Strip Searches at Airports? (Nov. 22, 1996), at http://
www.aclu.org/news/w112296a.html.
t The thesis and arguments formulated in this Comment are predicated on
theories of jurisprudence and international air travel policy pre-September 11, 2001.
Most assuredly, the principles within this Comment are applicable to domestic air
travel; however, the Author, in preparing this Comment, did not consider or even
contemplate that such tragic events would ultimately thrust the thesis of this
Comment into a matter of utmost national security. The events of September 11,
2001, have undoubtedly changed our understanding of air travel, but we must all still
promote a steadfast union to our constitutional liberties as a fundamental necessity.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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phatic refusal to be subjected to injustices they knew all too well
under an English regime.2 Modern science and technology, however,
have presented new types of injustices that the First Congress could
never have contemplated.
Imagine you have just touched ground in the United States from a
Far East vacation. Your memories are as vivid now as the first time
you went over ten years ago. As you walk off the plane, a U.S. Customs agent conducts a brief interview and asks if you have anything to

declare. You answer "No," but the Customs agent suspects otherwise

and directs you to a device you do not remember from ten years ago.
Within minutes a "'dim and unattractive"" image of your naked body

appears on a monitor revealing the shapes and forms of your body.
You feel violated, as though you were just electronically stripped of

one of the most fundamental rights you enjoy as a United States citizen. The low-level x-ray revealed no contraband, so you are finally
released.
This story could be a reality to any passenger landing from an international flight at several United States airports.4 The new sensoryenhancing device known as Body Scan Imaging Technology is the latest effort by Customs to curtail the influx of contraband hidden on
passengers entering our international borders.5 Although the Body
Scan is new, the courts' attempts to find a balance between technological innovations and an individual's right to privacy are not.6 Modern
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and
no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
Id.
2. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 641 (1886) (Miller, J., concurring); see
also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463 (1928) ("The well known historical
purpose of the Fourth Amendment, directed against general warrants and writs of
assistance, was to prevent the use of governmental force to search a man's house, his
person, his papers and his effects; and to prevent their seizure against his will.").
3. Jane A. Zanca, Customs Expands Body Search X-Ray Plan, APBNEwS.COM
(Mar. 27, 2000), at http://www.apbonline.com/safetycenter/transport/2000/03/27/
bodyxray0327_01.html (quoting Amitai Etzioni, Professor of Social Sciences, George
Washington University).
4. Press Release, U.S. Customs Serv., Body Imaging Systems (Jan. 27, 2000), at
http://www.customs.gov/hot-new/pressrel/2000/0127-OO.htm
[hereinafter Press Release]. "Systems are currently in place at JFK Airport, Miami International Airport,
Chicago O'Hare Airport, Atlanta Hartsfield Airport, Houston Intercontinental Airport, and Los Angeles International Airport," id., and they were scheduled to be in
place at Dulles International and Newark International Airports by March 2000, id.
5. See PERS. SEARCH REVIEW COMM'N, U.S. CUSTOMS SERVICE, REPORT ON
PERSONAL SEARCHES

26 (2000) [hereinafter

PERSONAL SEARCH REPORT],

available

at http://www.customs.gov/personal-search/pdfs/full.pdf.
6. See, for example, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), for the legal progression of wiretapping.
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courts are still struggling with a predicament that plagued them long
ago.
We have learned in our lifetimes, time and again, the inherent dangers that result from coupling unchecked "law enforcement" discretion with the tools of medical technology. Accordingly, in this
country at least, "[t]he importance of informed, detached and deliberate [judicial] determinations of the issue whether or not to invade
another's body in search of evidence of guilt is indisputable and
great." 7

The struggle for an adequate balance requires the courts to determine
where the Body Scan will fall within the prevailing Fourth Amendment judicial interpretations of "unreasonableness." As sense-enhancing technologies become increasingly sophisticated with the goal
of protecting our nation's public, reasonableness, as interpreted by
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, must maintain its integrity.
This Comment explores the government's use of Body Scan Imaging Technology as a constitutionally valid means of ensuring public
safety, provided that it is conducted based on a reasonable suspicion
in order to protect an individual's expectation of privacy. Part II details the creation, use, and criticism of the new Body Scan technology.
Part III provides a brief history of Customs authority at our borders
and discusses the interpretation of the judicial term "reasonableness"
as it is applied through various types of searches and government policies at our international borders. Part IV argues that the Body Scan
should be viewed as a non-routine border search and secures this determination through the Vega-Barvo x-ray test.8 Part V evaluates various levels of suspicion and counter-arguments for the
implementation of the Body Scan. Part VI concludes that the Body
Scan is a type of non-routine border search and will best secure an
individual's expectation of privacy by applying reasonable suspicion as
the appropriate judicial standard. Under this analysis, the Body Scan
is a constitutionally "reasonable" method to search individuals at our
borders within the bounds of the Fourth Amendment.
II.

THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW TECHNOLOGY

A. The Body Scan
The personal search is the most effective method available to find
contraband on human couriers by Customs today.9 In response to re7. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 562 (1985) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
770 (1966)).
8. United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1346 (11th Cir. 1984).
9. U.S. Customs Service Passenger Inspection Operations: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 55

(2000) (statement of Robert Tobias, Nat'l President, Nat'l Treasury Employees
Union); see also Zanca, supra note 3 (reporting the majority of heroin seized by Cus-
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cent criticism, investigations, and lawsuits based on allegations of racially motivated and abusive searches,' 0 Customs Commissioner
Raymond W. Kelly has introduced several initiatives to ensure effective but less intrusive personal searches." l Among the technological
solutions to less intrusive searches available, Customs has introduced
2
Body Scan Imaging Technology at several international airports.
The Body Scan is a personal inspection system that screens individuals for the presence of contraband.' 3 The device uses non-stationary,
narrow beams of x-ray energy to scan the clothed body. 14 X-rays are
directed through a rotating "chopper wheel" that directs a narrow
"pencil beam" in a single vertical scan of an object. 5 The x-rays are
then "reflected" to the backscatter detectors and sent to the processing unit. 6 Unlike medical x-rays, the emissions reflect off of an image
instead of fully penetrating it, revealing features near the body's surface.'" The radiation received as a result of a scan is between three
and five microrems, an amount less than a person absorbs from a minute of flight time at an altitude of 35,000 feet.' 8 Customs hopes the
Body Scan's hands-off approach will be less intrusive and will quiet
the controversy over the agency's searches. 19

toms has been from airline passengers). More specifically, during the period between
October 1, 1998, and March 31, 1999, 70% of all heroin seizures and 38% of all cocaine seizures were the result of positive searches of air passengers. PERSONAL
SEARCH REPORT, supra note 5, at 3.
10. Jeannine Aversa, Customs to Change Search Policy, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug.
4, 1999, 1999 WL 22030248.
Ill. PERSONAL SEARCH REPORT, supra note 5, at v, 26. The new initiatives include: adopting a new approval process for searches, implementing training initiatives,
informing passengers of their rights, improving inspector identification, analyzing passenger complaints, and utilizing airline and airport resources. Id. at 20.
12. Id. at 26 (stating at JFK, Customs uses the BodySearch manufactured by
American Science and Engineering, and at Miami, Customs uses the RAPISCAN Secure 1000). All Body Scan Imaging Technology will collectively be referred to as the
Body Scan.
13. Am. Sci. & ENG'G, BODYSEARCH PERSONNEL INSPECTION SYSTEM, at http://
www.as-e.com/products/pr-b-t-body.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2000) (on file with the
Texas Wesleyan Law Review). Body Scan has been used by two foreign countries for
detection by a head of state security and by a state prison as a substitute for strip
searches. Id.
14. Press Release, supra note 4.
15. Hank Schlesinger, Border Guard, POPULAR SCi., Apr. 2000, at 62, 63.
16. Id.
17. Id.

18. Id. "A [microrem or] millirem is a unit [of measurement] that estimates the
biological impact of a particular type of radiation absorbed in the body." See

NAT'L

(April
2000), available at http://www.nih.gov/health/chip/od/radiation.
19. Michael Allen, Are These X-Rays Too Revealing?: Targeting Drug Smugglers,
Airport Screening Device Sees Right Through Clothes, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2000, at
B1.
INSTITUTE OF HEALTH, FACT SHEET, WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT RADIATION
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B. The Critics
Even though Customs promotes the Body Scan as less intrusive
than a patdown, 20 privacy advocates claim "'[i]t's an electronic strip
search, and it's extremely graphic.' "21 Critics argue that "'[a]n electronic strip search is not an advance in passenger privacy.' ''2 2 The
Body Scan also won the Orwell Award for the most invasive proposal
at Privacy International's Annual Conference.2 3 Scholars and privacy

advocates from around the world join together to present this award
to the government agency that has done the most to invade personal
privacy. Some argue the new technology will make it easier for Customs to conduct searches, leading to the release of naked images of
suspects for public viewing, more examinations by Customs, and consequently, more abuse. 24 Privacy advocates feel the Body Scan's "dis-

torted funhouse effect

' 25

provides images that are just as bad as any

27
patdown. In addition to privacy concerns, the exceptional costs of
28
the machine coupled with its minimal use create an unfeasible alternative. Among critics, there seems to be a consensus that the Body

26

Scan will present an unreasonable invasion of privacy.
III.

PROTECTING OUR NATION'S BORDERS

A.

Statutory Authority

As one of our Nation's first lines of defense against the importation
of contraband, Customs has the authority to search passengers arriving from international flights. Ever since the First Congress, the
United States Customs Service has been authorized by statute to conduct personal searches at ports of entry2 9 to ensure that all goods and
20. Press Release, supra note 4.
21. Allen, supra note 19 (quoting Barry Steinhardt, Associate Director, ACLU,
N.Y.).
22. Zanca, supra note 3 (quoting Gregory Nojeim, Legislative Counsel, ACLU).
23. Privacy International is a public service organization dedicated to preserving
and promoting privacy. In 2000, Privacy International presented its Second Annual
"Big Brother" awards to the government and private sector organizations which have
done the most to invade personal privacy in the United States. The infamous
"Orwell" statue, presented to the government agencies that have done the most to
invade personal privacy, was awarded to the Federal Aviation Administration for its
use of the Body Scan. PRIVACY INT'L, ABOUT PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL, at http://
www.privacyinternational.org/contact.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2002); PRIVACY
INTERNATIONAL, THE 2000 US BIG BROTHER AWARDS,

at http://www.privacy

international.org/bigbrother/us2000/ (Apr. 5, 2000).
24. Allen, supra note 19.
25. Zanca, supra note 3.
26. Allen, supra note 19.
27. Zanca, supra note 3 (providing a cost of $125,000 for each BodySearch scan
unit).
28. PERSONAL SEARCH REPORT, supra note 5, at 26 (finding that passengers chose
the Body Scan only 13% of the time).
29. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, §§ 23-24, 1 Stat. 29, 43 (1789) (current version at 19
U.S.C. §§ 482, 1582 (1994)).

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

5

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 8 [2022], Iss. 2, Art. 6

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8

persons entering and exiting the United States do so in compliance
with all United States laws and regulations.3" Specifically, Customs
was given the authority to conduct searches in the Tariff Act of 1930.31
The Tariff Act of 1930's § 482 allows Customs to search and seize individuals at the border they suspect of carrying merchandise subject to
duty or merchandise imported contrary to law.32 The Tariff Act of
1930's § 1582 authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to prescribe
regulations for the search of persons and baggage as well as regulations under which all persons coming into the United States shall be
33
subject to detention and search by authorized government officials.
These statutes were enacted by the First Congress-the same Congress that enacted the Fourth Amendment-to give Customs the au34
thority to protect our nation's borders and ensure public safety.
Since the gathering of the First Congress, Customs has been legally
authorized to defend our nation from the importation of contraband.
B.

ConstitutionalInterpretations

The Fourth Amendment gives people the right to be secure against
unreasonable searches and seizures and ensures that no warrants will
be issued without probable cause.3 Traditionally, the Supreme Court
placed their Fourth Amendment analysis on basic principles of property law.3 6 The Supreme Court in Olmstead v. United States demonstrated this principle when it allowed government officials to wiretap
ordinary telephone poles from the suspects' houses.3 7 The Court
found no search because there was no actual physical invasion on the
suspects' property. For almost forty years, the law did not keep pace
with advances in scientific technology, 3 8 at least not until the Supreme
Court heard Katz v. United States. 39 The Katz Court abandoned the
basic property contentions that limited the Fourth Amendment and
instead expanded its scope to "protect[] people, not places." 4 The
majority in Katz maintained that a man "will remain free from unrea30. PERSONAL SEARCH REPORT, supra note 5, at v.
31. 19 U.S.C. §§ 482, 1582 (1994).
32. Id. § 482.
33. Id. § 1582.
34. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 585-87 (1983); United
States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616-17 (1977); cf U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Act of July
31, 1789, §§ 23-24. The dates are within the term of the First Congress.
35. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
36. See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-35 (1942) (applying a trespass equals search analysis); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 passim (1928)
(applying a trespass equals search analysis).
37. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 456-57.
38. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 45-53 (1967) (detailing the history of wiretapping and eavesdropping).
39. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
40. Id. at 351.
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sonable searches and seizures" wherever he may be.4 ' Justice Harlan
concurred with this principle and established a two-part test to determine whether a protected privacy interest exists: (1) whether a person
has exhibited an "actual (subjective) expectation of privacy" and (2)
whether that "expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize
as 'reasonable.'" 4 2 In essence, if a state action infringes upon a person's actual and reasonable expectation of privacy, the Fourth
Amendment is violated.
Although an actual and reasonable expectation of privacy may exist, courts have found certain searches "reasonable" when conducted
for a special governmental interest. If the search involves a special
governmental interest, neither probable cause nor a warrant may be
required to conduct the search,4 3 although such searches are still restricted by the constitutional requirement of reasonableness.4 4 Even
before the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, border searches and
searches at the border's "functional equivalents" have been considered "reasonable" simply because the search occurs at the border.4 5
The border search exception also extends to international airports because they are considered the "functional equivalent" of a regular
border checkpoint. 6 As early as 1925, in Carroll v. United States, the
Supreme Court recognized that "[t]ravellers may be so stopped in
crossing an international boundary because of national self protection
reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself as
41. Id. at 359.
42. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
43. David A. Harris, Superman's X-Ray Vision and the Fourth Amendment: The
New Gun Detection Technology, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 26-27 (1996). See id. at 26-27,
for examples of special governmental needs. See, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 431
U.S. 606, 616-17 (1977); see also United States v. Mejia, 720 F.2d 1378, 1381-82 (5th
Cir. 1983) ("[F]or policy reasons, searches at national borders, consented or unconsented, are permissible and do not require 'full-blown probable cause'; reasonable
suspicion is sufficient." (quoting United States v. Himmelwright, 551 F.2d 991, 994
(5th Cir. 1977))).
44. United States v. Villabona-Garnica, 63 F.3d 1051, 1057 (11th Cir. 1995). "Border searches are not subject to the probable cause and warrant requirements of the
Fourth Amendment; rather, they are simply subject to that amendment's more amorphous reasonableness standard." Id. (citing Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 619; United States v.
Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1344 (11th Cir. 1984)). See, e.g., Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 620
(stating that the border search exception is subject to the substantive limitations imposed by the Constitution).
45. Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 619; Mejia, 720 F.2d at 1.381 (citing United States v. Sandier, 644 F.2d 1163, 1169 (5th Cir. May 1981) (en bane)); see also Note, Border
Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 77 YALE L.J. 1007, 1012 (1968) (explaining
other factors for the border search). Border searches put international travelers on
notice that certain types of searches are likely to be made, and such searches are
administered to a class of people (international travelers), which decreases the likelihood of insult. Id.
46. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272-73 (1973); United States
v. Cardenas, 9 F.3d 1139, 1147-48 (5th Cir. 1993) (concluding that an international
airport is in essence no different than the border with respect to the border search
exception).
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entitled to come in." 47 For example, in Thomas v. United States, the
Fifth Circuit justified the special need to conduct warrantless border
searches on the large amounts of narcotics being smuggled across our
nation's borders.48 The border search thrives as a uniquely crafted
exception to the Fourth Amendment based on special policy considerations that recognize the difficult task of policing our nation's
borders.49

Although Customs may conduct warrantless searches, such searches
are still bound by the Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness" standard. "[T]he constitutional right to travel may not be conditioned
upon the relinquishment of ...

the Fourth Amendment right to be

free of unreasonable search[] .. ..- 50 Like all other inquiries into
what constitutes a search, 51 the starting point for the Body Scan inquiry begins with Katz v. United States. This test asks whether the use
of the Body Scan is a search that infringes upon one's actual and reasonable expectation of privacy. However, the strong governmental interest supporting the Body Scan's objective insulates it from Katz and
only requires that the search be reasonable according to the Fourth
Amendment. Thus, the initial inquiry to be made is whether the actual search conducted was reasonable under the circumstances. 52 This
question compels Customs to justify their actual intrusion 53 into a person's privacy with objective facts.54 "The greater the level of suspicion, the more intrusive the search may be."'5 5 Consequently, the
amount of suspicion required to conduct a Body Scan is correlated to
the type of search to which the Body Scan is most similar. In essence,
in order to determine the Body Scan's reasonableness, one must determine where exactly the Body Scan lies in relation to the available
search techniques used by Customs.

47. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925).
48. Thomas v. United States, 372 F.2d 252, 254 n.4 (5th Cir. 1967).
49. Id. at 254.
50. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 913 (9th Cir. 1973).
51. Harris, supra note 43, at 17.
52. See generally United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1349 (11th Cir. 1984)
(placing the burden of proof on the government).
53. See United States v. Mejia, 720 F.2d 1378, 1382 (5th Cir. 1983). "[I]ntrusion is
keyed to embarrassment, indignity, and invasion of privacy." Id. (citing United States
v. Sandier, 644 F.2d 1163, 1167 (5th Cir. May 1981) (en banc)).
54. PERSONAL SEARCH REPORT, supra note 5, app. I ("Six Bases for Searches");
see also United States v. Ogberaha, 771 F.2d 655, 657-58 (2d Cir. 1.985) (holding that
"an intrusive body seach is justified only if the border official can articulate facts
'based upon something more than the border crosssing' that raise the suspicion of
illegal concealment" (citing United States v. Asbury, 586 F.2d 973, 975 (2d Cir.

1978))).
55. Mejia, 720 F.2d at 1382.
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C. Personal Search Techniques

Along with its broad constitutional discretion, Customs also possesses a variety of personal search techniques that help circumvent the
stream of contraband into the United States. The personal search
continuum starts with routine searches, which are conducted with
minimal intrusion and no suspicion.5 6 The continuum then progresses
into non-routine searches that require higher standards of suspicion
due to the highly intrusive nature of the technique used.5 7 Thus, the
vital inquiry is, "when does a search of a person entering the country
cease to be [a] routine search permissible upon unsupported suspicion
and become a strip search permissible only upon a showing of reasonable suspicion?" 5 8
Most courts examine the degree of intrusiveness to determine
whether a search was routine or non-routine. Routine luggage
searches and patdowns may be conducted with no suspicion and usually only require minimal intrusion.5 9 Strip searches, x-ray examinations, and body cavity searches can be highly intrusive and, therefore,
must be supported by reasonable suspicion.6" The Ninth Circuit requires a higher level of suspicion because it feels the intrusion of an xray is so harmful, and the indignity suffered during a body cavity
search is so offensive, that there must be a "clear indication" of suspicion.6 ' The reasonableness standard affords Customs a balance between private and public interests when they "must make a limited
intrusion on less than probable cause." 6 2 Regardless of the standard
applied, it will only be applied if the act is truly intrusive; however,
courts have relied on different interpretations of intrusiveness.
To determine the "intrusiveness" level of the internal body
searches involved in today's cases, it is necessary to decide whether
intrusiveness is to be defined in terms of whether one search will
reveal more than another, or whether intrusiveness is to be interpreted in terms of the indignity that will be suffered by the person
being searched. For example, is an x-ray more intrusive than a cavity search because it will reveal more than the cavity search, or less
human dignity to the
intrusive because it does not infringe upon
63
same extent as a search of private parts?
56. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d at 1345 ("No articulable suspicion is required for routine
border searches which only intrude slightly on a persons privacy." (citing United
States v. Himmelwright, 551 F.2d 991, 993-94 (5th Cir. 1977))).

57. 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 10.5(c) (3d ed. 1996).
58. Id.
59. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d at 1345.
60. Id. at 1345, 1349.

61. E.g., United States v. Ek, 676 F.2d 379, 382 (9th Cir. 1982) (requiring "'clear
indication"' for both body cavity and x-ray searches (quoting United States v. Aman,
624 F.2d 911, 912 (9th Cir. 1980))).

62. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985).
63. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d at 1345.
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The difference between the strip search and the patdown lies in the
amount of intrusion suffered by the individual. Although the Supreme Court has not decided "under what circumstances, a border
search might be deemed 'unreasonable' because of the particularly offensive manner in which it is carried out,"64 in the past, some courts
have looked to the extent of the physical invasion of privacy,65 while
other courts have taken the more modern approach of examining the
actual indignity suffered.66 The reasonableness standard is a flexible
test that adjusts the strength of suspicion to the intrusiveness of that
search, so as the amount of intrusiveness increases, the amount of67suspicion necessary to justify the search correspondingly increases.
1. Routine Border Searches
A routine border search is one technique Customs utilizes to inspect international travelers that seek entrance into the United States.
Any person coming into the United States may be subjected to a
search by this fact alone, whether or not Customs suspects the particular person seeking entrance of any illegality. 68 Regardless of suspicion, routine border searches are deemed "reasonable" simply
because the person or item in question has entered the country from
the outside. 69 A routine border search may consist of a search for
contraband through a patdown, a limited search of the person's clothing,7 ° or a search for weapons through a frisk. Routine border
searches usually subject a person to only a minimal amount of intru64. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 618 n.13 (1977); cf.Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541 n.4 (giving no view on what level of suspicion, if any, is required for non-routine border searches).
65. See generally Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding that
a wiretap was not a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
because it did not physically invade defendant's property).
66. United States v. Villabona-Garnica, 63 F.3d 1051, 1057 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing
Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d at 1346); Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d at 1345-46; United States v.
Mejia, 720 F.2d 1378, 1381-82 (5th Cir. 1983).
67. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d at 1344; Mejia, 720 F.2d at 1382 ("The greater the level
of suspicion, the more intrusive the search may be."). For example, more "reasonable
suspicion" is required for a body cavity search than a strip search.
68. United States v. Odland, 502 F.2d 148, 151 (7th Cir. 1974). Although by policy, Customs requires mere suspicion to conduct a patdown. PERSONAL SEARCH REPORT, supra note 5, at 28 n.16.
69. Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 619.
70. A patdown may consist of one or more of the following: (1) patting the hands
over a person's clothed body, (2) removing the person's shoes, (3) lifting a pant leg or
skirt a few inches, (4) removing a belt, (5) reaching into pockets, and (6) rolling up
shirt sleeves. U.S. CUSTOMS SERV., DEP'T OF TREASURY, PERSONAL SEARCH HANDBOOK 14 (1999) [hereinafter PERSONAL SEARCH HANDBOOK]. E.g., United States v.
Beras, 183 F.3d 22, 24, 26 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that a patdown of an international
traveler's legs was not intrusive enough to qualify as nonroutine); United States v.
Sandier, 644 F.2d 1163, 1169 (5th Cir. May 1981) (requiring that outer garments such
as jackets, hats, or shoes be removed, or that pockets, wallets, or purses be emptied
are considered routine searches); Untied States v. Flores, 477 F.2d 608, 609 (1st Cir.
1973) (allowing Customs to search traveler's pockets with little or no suspicion).
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sion or indignity. In 1981, the former Fifth Circuit addressed the invasion of privacy in routine border searches in United States v. Sandler."
In Sandler, the defendant was arrested at Miami International Airport
after a patdown search by Customs revealed 888 grams of cocaine
strapped to his legs.7 2 Mr. Sandler moved to suppress the evidence;7 3
however, the former Fifth Circuit found the search reasonable simply
because the defendant wanted to enter the country.74 The court found
the key variable to be the invasion of privacy and dignity of the individual. 75 The court did not believe removing one's shoes was embarrassing enough to impose a "reasonable suspicion" standard.76
In contrast, some courts will not allow a routine search unless it can
be predicated on some type of suspicion. 77 This requirement is inaccurate because the courts have consistently held that no suspicion is
required. 7 8 Despite its critics, the routine border search serves a valuable purpose in maintaining national security and efficiency while simultaneously placing only a minimal invasion of privacy on travelers.
2.

Non-Routine Border Searches

Some international travelers who seek entrance into the United
States may be subjected to detention or searches beyond that of a
routine Customs stop. If a search or detention of a traveler at the
border goes beyond a routine Customs stop, it becomes "non-routine"
and requires at least "reasonable suspicion" of smuggling or other
wrongdoing.7 9 The reasonable suspicion standard requires Customs
to have "'a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person"' of smuggling contraband.8 °
71. Sandler, 644 F.2d at 1167-69.
72. Id. at 1164.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1168.
75. Id. at 1167.
76. Id. at 1168.
77. See, e.g., United States v. Dorsey, 641 F.2d 1213, 1218 (7th Cir. 1981) (requiring "some level of suspicion," but refusing to label the degree needed); People v.
Luna, 535 N.E.2d 1305, 1308 (N.Y. 1989) (requiring "some minimal level of particularized suspicion").
78. E.g., United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985) ("Routine searches of the persons and effects of entrants are not subject to any requirement
of reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or warrant .... ); United States v. Rivas, 157
F.3d 364, 367 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that a routine border search may be conducted
without probable cause or any suspicion); United States v. Ezeiruaku, 936 F.2d 136,
140 (3d Cir. 1991) (requiring no individualized suspicion to search luggage at the
border).
79. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541; see, e.g., United States v. Ogberaha, 771 F.2d 655, 658 (2d Cir. 1985) (recognizing the "reasonable suspicion" standard
as applying to strip searches); United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1349 (11th
Cir. 1984) (requiring reasonable suspicion to conduct an x-ray examination).
80. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541-42 (quoting United States v. Cortez,
449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).
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a. Strip Searches
Once a personal search by Customs goes beyond a limited invasion,
the search may become a strip search and must be supported by reasonable suspicion. A strip search consists of removing one's clothing,
either all or in part. For example, in United States v. Himmelwright,
the court upheld the removal of the defendant's blouse and slacks,
which revealed a cocaine-filled condom protruding from her vagina.8
When examining the intrusion of the strip searches, the court found
the reasonable suspicion standard to be "flexible enough to afford the
full measure
of protection which the [F]ourth [A]mendment
82
commands.
In order to improve its service, Customs now requires their reasonable or real suspicion to be based on objective and articulable facts that
are sufficiently related to the portion of the body or clothing being
searched.83 Courts have long recognized many factors that indicate
suspicious behavior, including: unusual conduct, needle-marks, an itinerary suggestive of wrongdoing, an informant's tip, discovery of incriminating matter during routine searches, and bulky clothing.84
Most courts that uphold the legality of a strip search rely upon a combination of the determinative "factors rather than upon any of them
standing alone."85 Customs has categorized these types of articulable
facts into six areas: behavioral analysis, observation techniques, inconsistencies, intelligence, K-9, and those incident to a seizure or arrest. 86
By law, a Customs agent is not justified in asking an international
traveler to remove his or her clothing unless he has a reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts that this person is attempting to
smuggle contraband into the country.
b. Intrusions into the Body
In an effort to continue the undetected flow of narcotics across our
borders, drug smugglers have resorted to transporting narcotics inside
their bodies. Because of the frequency of such cases appearing in the
courts, the courts have taken notice of this accepted practice conducted by experienced smugglers.87 Alimentary canal smuggling provides no external signs; consequently, inspectors rarely possess
probable cause to arrest such a smuggler.88 Body cavity searches may
81. United States v. Himmelwright, 551 F.2d 991, 993, 996 (5th Cir. 1977).
82. Id. at 995 (requiring reasonable suspicion for a lawful strip search).
83. United States v. Guadalupe-Garza, 421 F.2d 876, 879 (9th Cir. 1970) (defining
the "real suspicion" test of Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805, 808 (9th Cir.
1967)); PERSONAL SEARCH REPORT, supra note 5, app. I.
84. United States v. Asbury, 586 F.2d 973, 976-77 (2d Cir. 1978).
85. Id. at 977.
86. PERSONAL SEARCH REPORT, supra note 5, app. I.
87. Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1966).
88. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985).
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include inspections of the vagina, 89 rectum, 90 or the use of emetics to
flush the contents of the stomach out.9 Due to the highly intrusive
nature of a body cavity examination, Customs must support such
searches with more than mere suspicion.
In examining the type of suspicion required for a body cavity
search, the Supreme Court in United States v. Montoya de Hernandez
remained silent; however, the Supreme Court pronounced a valuable
foundation that has set the standard for lower courts. 92 In its ruling,
the Montoya de Hernandez Court refused to recognize the "clear indi' as a third verbal standard to the well established "reasonable
cation"93
suspicion" and "probable cause" principles. 94 The Court proclaimed
"reasonable suspicion" supported by "'a particularized and objective
basis for suspecting the particular person' of alimentary canal smuggling" as the sole standard needed to justify the detention of an international traveler beyond the scope of a routine border search.95
Although the Montoya de Hernandez Court did not apply "reasonable
suspicion" to any specific non-routine border searches, 96 the Court ingeniously established a standard for non-routine border searches by
eliminating any other interpretation of "reasonableness."
c.

Medical X-Ray Searches

Instead of, or in conjunction with, the body cavity search, Customs
may choose to utilize an x-ray machine to detect contraband. Courts
require Customs to have "suspicion, reasonable under the circumstances, that a person may be carrying drugs internally before a person's stomach may be searched by x-ray." 97 X-ray searches fall within
the Fourth Amendment because the machine's primary purpose is to
locate items "where there is normally an expectation of privacy[ ]."98
The level of intrusion of an x-ray search is questionable because x-rays
89. E.g., United States v. Ogberaha, 771 F.2d 655, 657, 660 (2d Cir. 1985).
90. E.g., United States v. Pino, 729 F.2d 1357, 1358 (11th Cir. 1984).
91. E.g., United States v. Briones, 423 F.2d 742, 743 (5th Cir. 1970).
92. See, e.g., Ogberaha, 771 F.2d at 658 (refusing "to adopt a 'clear indication'
standard in the context of a body cavity search").
93. However, by policy, Customs requires that reasonable suspicion be founded
upon a clear indication or plain suggestion of alimentary smuggling. PERSONAL
SEARCH REPORT, supra note 5, at 28 n.16. The Ninth Circuit is a supporter of the
clear indication standard. See, e.g., United States v. Quintero-Castro, 705 F.2d 1099,
1100 (9th Cir. 1983) (using the clear indication standard to find reasonable suspicion);
Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703, 710 (9th Cir. 1966) ("There must exist facts
creating a clear indication ... of the smuggling.").
94. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 540-41 (1985).
95. Id. at 541-42 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)).
96. Id. at 541 n.4.
97. E.g., United States v. Padilla, 729 F.2d 1367, 1368 (11th Cir. 1984).
98. United States v. Doe, 786 F. Supp. 1073, 1079 (D.P.R. 1991). In Doe, the court
invalidated a warrantless x-ray search for drugs conducted by Agriculture Inspectors
because it was not pursuant to their normal administrative functions. Id.
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do not pose an actual physical invasion, yet they can pose harmful
medical effects.
The court in United States v. Vega-Barvo examined the level of intrusion by asking whether "an x-ray [is] more intrusive than a cavity
search because it will reveal more than the cavity search, or less intrusive because it does not infringe upon human dignity to the same extent as a search of private parts?"9 9 In determining what level of
suspicion to apply, the court reasoned that the personal indignity suffered by the individual being searched would control. 100 The court
concluded that because the x-ray search was more intrusive than a
frisk and no more intrusive than a strip search, reasonable suspicion
was required to conduct the x-ray search."0 1 The Vega-Barvo court
found that three factors tend to control the level of insult to personal
privacy and contribute to the personal indignity suffered by the person: "(1) physical contact between the searcher and the person
10 2
searched; (2) exposure of intimate body parts; and (3) use of force."
The court evaluated these three factors and concluded that x-rays are
unintrusive because they do not require physical contact or expose
intimate body parts and will generally not be performed without consent;' 0 3 however, the threat of tissue destruction and severe skin burns
by overexposure to x-rays'0 4 have sparked arguments to the
contrary. 105
The defendant in Vega-Barvo conceded to the x-ray's unoffensive
nature, but he argued that the medical dangers should control the intrusiveness issue.10 6 In his Vega-Barvo dissent, Judge Hatchett argued
that he would apply the highest standard of reasonable suspicion to xray searches because it has an element that is missing from other types
of searches: "a danger to the life of the suspect." 107 Justice Brennan,
dissenting in Montoya de Hernandez, agreed with the conclusion "that
a routine medical x ray takes about six days off a person's life expectancy,"' 0 8 and, therefore, cannot be a justified "choice" for a suspect
99. United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1345 (11th Cir. 1984).
100. Id. at 1346.
101. Id. at 1349.
102. Id. at 1346.
103. Id. at 1348.
104. THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 3120-21 (Paul Lagassd ed., 6th ed. 2000).
105. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 561 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (discussing health risks); United States v. Ek, 676 F.2d 379, 382
(9th Cir. 1982) (admitting that an x-ray is more intrusive than a strip search because it
poses health risks).
106. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d at 1348.
107. Id. at 1352 (Hatchett, J., dissenting). Judge Hatchett urged the court to recognize a third level of suspicion labeled "substantial suspicion" for x-ray examinations.
Id. at 1352 n.2.
108. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 561 n.32 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing
Earle C. Gregg, Effects of Ionizing Radiationson Humans, in 2 HANDBOOK OF MEDICAL PHYSICS 375, 404 (R. Waggener ed., 1984) (showing harmful effects of x-rays)).
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without a search warrant.' 0 9 The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Ek
found that x-rays should only be used where a "clear indication" exists
that a suspect is concealing contraband within his body. 110 The Ek
court reasoned that while an x-ray search may not be as humiliating as
a strip search, because it exceeds a passive inspection of body surfaces,
it is nevertheless a more intrusive search and is potentially harmful to
a suspect's health. 1 ' Despite these valiant attempts to apply a more
strict standard to x-ray searches, the flexible standard of "reasonable
suspicion" described in Montoya de Hernandez"2 still prevails as the
majority standard." 3
D.

Entering America Through Customs: A Look at Policy
and Procedure

International travelers that attempt to enter the United States
through our nation's airports can expect a thorough inspection of their
person and belongings if suspected of carrying contraband. However,
by policy, Customs implements several procedures that attempt to
bind the intrusion with reasonableness. In the normal course of their
duties, Customs may stop and question any incoming traveler simply
because they are attempting to enter the United States." 4 If during
this questioning, the agent develops at least a mere suspicion 15 that
the traveler is concealing contraband, the agent may subject the traveler to a routine search, including a patdown or frisk" 6 and now a
Body Scan. The policies adopted are Customs's attempts to balance
the need to protect our nation's borders with the need to respect a
person's privacy.
Passengers who will be searched may now choose between a Body
Scan or a patdown. To perform a Body Scan, the inspector must first
receive the written consent of that passenger. 1 7 After consent is
given, the inspector must then seek approval from his or her supervisor 1 8 as if he were performing a patdown." 9 The inspector perform109. Id. at 561.
110. Ek, 676 F.2d at 382.
111. Id.
112. See Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541.
113. See United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1344, 1349 (11th Cir. 1984).
114. See PERSONAL SEARCH REPORT, supra note 5, at 5.
115. Id. at 28 n.16 (detailing Customs's policy which requires "mere suspicion" to
conduct a patdown). But see discussion supra Part III.C.1 (explaining that the Constitution does not require any suspicion for a routine border search).
116. PERSONAL SEARCH REPORT, supra note 5, at 28 n.16.
117. Press Release, supra note 4. The traveler will also be shown a photocopy of an
image of a person of their same gender, which will later be attached to their signed
consent form. Travelers who do not consent will be subject to the appropriate personal search. Letter from Sandra Peaks, Supervisory Program Analyst, Office of
Field Operations, U.S. Customs Service, to Stephen R. Vifia 2 (Dec. 11, 2000) (on file
with author).
118. Press Release, supra note 4.
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ing the Body Scan must be the same sex as the passenger being
20
examined and is the only one with a view of the Body Scan images.1
In addition, the Body Scan is conducted outside the view of the general public.' 2 ' For those passengers who object to being touched, the
Body Scan provides a highly regulated option that helps ensure their
privacy.
If an agent still suspects that the passenger is concealing contraband
after the patdown or Body Scan, the agent may then conduct a nonroutine search, but only if the agent's reasonable suspicion is based on
articulable facts.122 If a passenger is suspected of carrying contraband
inside the body, then he or she will be asked to consent to a medical xray. 12 ' Finally, Customs may subject a passenger to a body cavity
search, but only if the agent's reasonable suspicion is based upon
a
"clear indication" or "plain suggestion" of internal smuggling. 124
Although the courts have allowed Customs significant leeway in its
searches, 125 Customs, in an abundance of caution, still attempts to
bind its search procedures with strict protocol. However, it is Customs's attempt to place the Body Scan within its existing procedures
that presents a unique problem.
IV.

FINDING A HOME FOR THE BODY SCAN

A.

The FactualSimilarities

Body Scan imaging technology presents problems that span the
spectrum of personal search techniques. The initial inquiry should attempt to compare the Body Scan's similarities with the patdown and
strip search. Most of the answers correspond to the degree of intrusion placed on the traveler. Finding a stronger intrusion into the privacy of travelers will require Customs to warrant a stronger
evidentiary justification as with body cavity or medical x-ray searches.
The Body Scan must be placed among the existing personal search
techniques to find the necessary suspicion for Customs to act.
The Body Scan is similar to a patdown search because they both
reveal only items directly under the clothes and allow the suspect to
stay clothed; however, the Body Scan may be considered less intrusive
because the suspect is never touched. Consequently, Customs promotes the Body Scan as their less intrusive alternative to the
119. See PERSONAL SEARCH REPORT, supra note 5, at 21 (requiring supervisor approval for all patdown personal searches).
120. Press Release, supra note 4.
121. Id.
122. PERSONAL SEARCH REPORT, supra note 5, at 28 n.16; see also id. app. I ("Six
Bases for Searches").
123. Id. at 28 n.16.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 5.
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patdown. 2 6 Even though patdowns will generally reveal the same
items as the Body Scan, similarities also exist with strip searches.
While critics argue that the Body Scan is simply an "'electronic strip
search,'''127 it does allow the suspect to stay clothed. However, the
net effect still reveals the same intimate areas that a strip search may
display. Both, in essence, allow Customs to inspect a suspect's most
private areas; one in person, the other electronically via television
monitor. As a result, the Body Scan should be treated as a non-routine border search and, more specifically, like a strip search.
Although critics are adamant about the invasions of privacy produced by the Body Scan, very few similarities actually exist between
the Body Scan and the most intrusive body cavity searches. The Body
Scan does not use rectal or vaginal probes or any other highly intrusive body cavity search technique. The Body Scan's only invasion into
the body involves a low dosage of x-ray radiation that penetrates a
few millimeters below the skin.' 28 The Body Scan uses x-ray radiation
similar to a medical x-ray of the alimentary canal but at a far lower
dosage.129 Body Scan x-rays simply do not pose the same health risks
as medical x-rays. 3 ' Another major difference exists in the image displayed. A medical x-ray can display internal organs or bones, while
the Body Scan will only display those features near the surface of the
body.13 The Body Scan differs in its implementation as well. By pol132
icy, travelers may choose between the Body Scan and a patdown,
and yet a medical x-ray may be administered involuntarily by court
order. 33 The amount of intrusion posed by the Body Scan is simply
not severe enough to subject it to the same policy standards as a body
cavity or medical x-ray search.
B.

The Vega-Barvo X-Ray Test

Because the Body Scan has characteristics that cover the multitude
of personal search techniques, the Vega-Barvo x-ray test should be
applied to determine the intrusiveness level and level of suspicion required to justify the search. The Eleventh Circuit, in Vega-Barvo, first
126. Press Release, supra note 4.
127. Zanca, supra note 3 (quoting Gregory Nojeim, Legislative Counsel, ACLU).
Nojeim warns that "'[a]n electronic strip search is not an advance in passenger privacy.'" Id. Barry Steinhardt, Associate Director of the ACLU in New York claims,
"'[it's an electronic strip search, and it's extremely graphic.'" Allen, supra note 19.
128. Press Release, supra note 4.
129. See id. (stating background radiation ranges from 10-20 microrem where the
Body Scan only emits 3-5); see also PERSONAL SEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 70,
app. A ("Body Scan Imaging Personal Search Consent Form") (finding the radiation
dosage as being equivalent to two minutes of an airplane ride).
130. In fact, independent reports claim the scan is even safe for pregnant women,
although by policy, Customs does not allow this practice. Press Release, supra note 4.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See United States v. Oyekan, 786 F.2d 832, 836 n.6, 837 (8th Cir. 1986).
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looked at the "physical contact between the searcher and the person
searched" to determine whether a less intrusive means existed. 1 34 The
Vega-Barvo court noted the constitutionality of metal-detectors and
canine sniffs as less intrusive means to patdowns and personal examinations of luggage. 135 Next, the Vega-Barvo court examined the "exposure of intimate body parts" because embarrassment often plays a
vital factor in the constitutionality of a border search. 3 6 The court
drew on distinctions between total strip searches and partial strip
searches and found only those searches that peered into the most intimate areas to be more embarrassing. 37 Lastly, the Vega-Barvo court
looked at the "use of force" necessary to conduct a search because
suspects are likely to38 suffer considerable indignity from a physically
forced body search.1
Despite its critics, 3 9 the Body Scan does not rise to the level of
intrusion that requires a level of suspicion higher than what is reasonable under the circumstances. Reasonable suspicion should be the
standard applied in order to justify a Body Scan search. Due to its
unique hands-off approach, Customs considers the Body Scan a less
intrusive alternative to patdowns. 4 ° Consequently, the Body Scan
satisfies the first prong of the Vega-Barvo x-ray test by concession. In
addition, the hands-off approach allows Customs to use only minimal
amounts of physical force to conduct the search. Furthermore, Customs gives all suspects a choice between a patdown or Body Scan and
requires consent to utilize either type of search. Thus, a higher level
of suspicion cannot be justified on account of the force used.
The best argument for a higher level of suspicion lies with the actual
embarrassment caused by the Body Scan due to the exposure of body
parts. However, the scanning is done out of the public's view. 1 ' Although the image is a naked body, they are not erotic 142 and will not
be kept unless contraband is found.' 4 3 Under the Vega-Barvo x-ray
test, the Body Scan simply does not rise to the level of intrusion required to justify a higher level of suspicion. Customs must be afforded
a flexible standard to guide their judgment on whether an international traveler should undergo a Body Scan.
134. United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d. 1341, 1346 (11th Cir. 1984).
135. Id. at 1346-47.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1347.
138. Id. at 1346-47.
139. See Allen, supra note 19.
140. Id.
141. Press Release, supra note 4.
142. Allen, supra note 19 ("'These international signs outside the bathroom [indicating men's and women's lavatories] are about as graphic as this.'") (quoting Vincent
DiGilio, Supervisory Inspector, JFK International Airport, N.Y.) (alteration in
original).
143. Press Release, supra note 4.
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V.

ANSWERS TO AN INVISIBLE PROBLEM

A.

Approaches from All Sides

A passenger should anticipate being temporarily detained at the
border while his personal effects are examined. However, this passenger should not have to anticipate being singled out, removed to a private examination room, and subjected to a personal search upon
reaching our border.1 44 No person deserves to be humiliated by the
indignity of a personal search unless there are good reasons to do
so.' 45 The fact that there is little case law on Body Scan type imaging
technology coupled with the courts' use of a case-by-case balancing
test to determine the constitutionality of searches have prevented a
bright line rule. 146 Thus, a variety of approaches spanning the most
restrictive to the most liberal interpretations are viable, but only the
most flexible approach will achieve the necessary balance between
privacy rights and protecting our nation's borders.
1.

A Probable Approach

The Fourth Amendment establishes the basic principle that a warrant based on probable cause must be issued before a place is
searched or person seized. 4 7 Justice Brennan in his rigorous Montoya
de Hernandez dissent advocated for the application of a probable
cause standard for custodial detentions. 148 Justice Brennan argued
that the probable cause standard affords the best compromise between the competing interests of law enforcement and individual liberty.' 4 9 Scholar David E. Steinberg suggests applying the warrant
requirement to those sense-enhanced searches that are most susceptible to abuse. 5 ' In determining the abuse, Steinberg focuses on "1)
[t]he specificity of the information revealed by the sense-enhanced
search, 2) [t]he limited duration of the sense-enhanced search, and 3)
[t]he extent to which the sense-enhanced search requires officers to
focus on a particular individual."'' Even though Customs enjoys the
liberty to conduct its searches without probable cause, these advocates
would still require probable cause if the intrusion were severe enough.
However, requiring probable cause for every search deemed nonroutine or intrusive would stifle Customs's effectiveness in protecting
144. United States v. Guadalupe-Garza, 421 F.2d 876, 878 (9th Cir. 1970).
145. Id.
146. Alexandra Coulter, Drug Couriersand the Fourth Amendment: Vanishing Privacy Rights for Commercial Passengers,43 VAND. L. REV. 1311, 1314-15 (1990).
147. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
148. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S 531, 565-66 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
149. Id.
150. David E. Steinberg, Making Sense of Sense-Enhanced Searches, 74 MINN. L.
REV. 563, 613 (1990).

151. Id.
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our nation's borders. If probable cause were necessary to utilize the
Body Scan, any efficiency left in the search process would certainly be
jeopardized. In addition, the difficulty in reaching probable cause
would reduce the risk of apprehension and thus remove the disincentive to smuggle. Even under Steinberg's warrant formula for senseenhanced searches, the Body Scan would not be susceptible to the
overbearing abuses mentioned. Although the Body Scan may reveal
an image of the body, the actual intrusion is quite limited because the
image is not kept unless needed for conviction. 152 In addition, the
Body Scan procedure is very selective and is not used to acquire information on unsuspecting third parties because, by policy, all suspects
will consent to being scanned. 1 53 Requiring probable cause for every
search or custodial detention at our nation's borders would suffocate
the efficiency and effectiveness of Customs's mission.
2.

A Routine Approach

As surveillance technology advances, the similarities between a
patdown search and the Body Scan may generate valid arguments for
lowering the level of suspicion required to justify a Body Scan search.
This rationale is supported by Customs's own admission that the Body
Scan is a less intrusive alternative to a patdown. 1 54 Both allow the
suspect to keep his or her clothes on, and both will only reveal what is
directly under the clothes. 155 Procedurally, both require supervisor
approval and an inspector of the same sex. 156 Consequently, both
types of searches theoretically obtain their results in the same manner.
Under this theory, Customs may subject any international traveler to
the Body Scan merely for entering the country,5 7 although by policy,
Customs's would still require some type of suspicion before subjecting
a person to a routine search.15 8 By substituting the Body Scan for a
patdown, Customs has ingeniously laid a foundation for a more liberal
application of the Body Scan for now and in the future.
Although the Body Scan may pass legal muster as a routine border
59
search, it may not be economically feasible. At $125,000 per unit,'
the Body Scan could be "'a monumental waste [of money] when multiplied by the number of airports in the U.S." ' 6 0 because personal
152. Press Release, supra note 4.
153. Id.
154. Id.

155. See

PERSONAL SEARCH REPORT,

supra note 5, at 28 n.16; see supra notes 14,

19 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
158. See Letter from Sandra Peaks, Supervisory Program Analyst, Office of Field
Operations, U.S. Customs Service, to Stephen R. Vifia, supra note 117, at 1.
159. Zanca, supra note 3.

160. Id. (quoting Mark Greer, Executive Director, Drug Sense) (alteration in
original).
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searches at airports accounted for less than one percent of the 1.35
million pounds of drugs discovered by Customs in 1998.6 In addition, because the Body Scan is not powerful enough to detect drugs in
the alimentary canal, 6 2 this number could be even lower. Due to the
lengthy consent process for the Body Scan, passengers have only preferred the Body Scan thirteen percent of the time.' 6 3 In fact, most
smugglers prefer a patdown because they assume most contraband
will be missed during the patting. 64 Furthermore, some critics argue
that the new technology will make it too easy for Customs to conduct
a search, which will increase the number of searches.' 6 5 "'If subjective good faith alone were the test, the' protections of the Fourth
Amendment would evaporate,' 1 , 66 increasing the likelihood of abuse.
Customs's attempt to liberalize the application of the Body Scan must
be confronted at the nexus of economic feasibility, national concern,
and judicial scrutiny.
3.

A Reasonable Approach

Although case law would allow Customs to conduct a Body Scan on
mere suspicion, by policy, it will only subject a person to a Body Scan
based on "good reason" to suspect that the traveler is carrying contraband on the body. 6 7 If "good reason" is interpreted to mean reasonable suspicion, Customs, in effect, has placed the Body Scan in the
non-routine category. This analysis would make the Body Scan
equivalent to a strip search, thus requiring reasonable suspicion to justify its use. Any type of strip search, whether electronic or physical,
should not be conducted without "reasonable" suspicion.
Under the Vega-Barvo x-ray test, the Body Scan proved to be so
unintrusive that it did not require a form of suspicion higher than
"reasonable suspicion." Still, the Body Scan uses x-ray technology
and should not be taken lightly or used without the limitation of reasonableness. The images displayed by the Body Scan are naked bodies, 168 and this type of intrusion demands a justification beyond that of
mere suspicion. Legislative counsel, Gregory Nojeim, for the ACLU,
proclaims "'that [the] 'size and shape' of sensitive body parts are not
proper security inquiries.' "169 A suspicion reasonable under the cir161. See id. But see PERSONAL SEARCH REPORT, supra note 5, at 3 (stating 70% of
all heroin seizures were the result of positive airport searches between October 1,
1998, and March 31, 1999).
162. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
163. PERSONAL SEARCH REPORT, supra note 5, at 26.
164. See Zanca, supra note 3.
165. Allen, supra note 19.
166. United States v. Guadalupe-Garza, 421 F.2d 876, 879 (9th Cir. 1970) (quoting
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964)).
167. Press Release, supra note 4.
168. ACLU News Wire, supra note t.
169. Id.
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cumstances is a flexible enough standard to serve our government's
interest and an individual's liberty.
Balancing the limited intrusion of the Body Scan against the government's need to use this technique produces a highly favorable outcome for the Body Scan. The balancing test used by courts often
considers such factors as available alternatives, official discretion, and
the scope of the search.17 Under this analysis, the Body Scan's
hands-off approach undoubtedly creates a favorable alternative.
Moreover, if the Body Scan is bound by reasonable suspicion, then
official discretion will be tightly monitored by Fourth Amendment
principles. Finally, the non-erotic images displayed by the Body Scan
" ' will ensure that the scope of the
coupled with its procedural checks17
search does not go beyond what is reasonably necessary. If bound by
the principle of reasonable suspicion, the Body Scan will provide a
valuable resource that protects our nation's borders and respects a
person's privacy.
B. An Answer to Both Sides
Each possible solution presents a unique set of circumstances that
encompasses the multitude of the Body Scan dilemmas. Allowing the
Body Scan to be conducted with no suspicion may produce more contraband seizures but will likely result in more litigation concerning privacy as well.' 72 Conducting Body Scan without suspicion leaves the
procedure susceptible to Fourth Amendment challenges. Conversely,
requiring probable cause may be too restrictive of a standard. The
probable cause standard would engulf the very flexibility that courts
demand we provide our border personnel. A Body Scan conducted
on reasonable suspicion promotes the basic premise of flexibility that
flows from so many border search cases. Under reasonable suspicion,
the Body Scan should flourish as an innovative search technique,
bound by both policy and the Fourth Amendment. Unlike the other
two standards, reasonable suspicion promotes both individual privacy
and national protection with equal vigor. Although Customs promotes the Body Scan as its alternative to a patdown, there seems to be
little if any "good reason" to place it in any other category than nonroutine border searches.
VI.

THE BODY SCAN:

Now

AND THE FUTURE

Solutions that will please everybody are difficult, if not impossible,
to create and implement. Few rights are more fundamental than a
170. See Harris, supra note 43, at 50.
171. See supra Part III.D (discussing the procedural safeguards implemented by
Customs for border searches).
172. The Federal Aviation Administration looked into the mass implementation of
the Body Scan as a screening procedure for all airline passengers but opted out, due
partly to privacy concerns. Allen, supra note 19.
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person's right to privacy, yet few items on this earth have a more devastating effect than illegal drugs. Whether to place the Body Scan in
the routine or non-routine category of searches is a difficult policy
judgment, but the best solution that can ensure a person's dignity and
protect our nation's borders is to justify every scan with reasonable
suspicion. There is no doubt that both sides of the argument have
valuable principles to protect.
Without question, technological advances in surveillance and security are extremely necessary and highly valuable resources. The war on
drugs is becoming more sophisticated and difficult to fight every day.
In recognition of this fight, Customs Commissioner Kelly pleaded,
"'[t]he hay stack is getting bigger, and we need all the help we can get
to find the needle." 173 The Body Scan is one of Customs's latest attempts to find that needle. It provides a less intrusive alternative to
other search techniques. As long as it is justified by reasonable suspicion, the Body Scan will continue to serve interests on both sides of
the spectrum and be a valuable resource. Customs is often our nation's first line of defense against drug couriers, and it should "not be
subjected to 'unrealistic second-guessing' by the courts."' 74 Until
technology can produce a device that adequately serves both public
and private interests in a way that is both cost-effective and time-saving, we must support virtual invasions of privacy with reasonable
suspicion.
Stephen Viiia
173. Schlesinger, supra note 15.
174. Garcia v. United States, 913 F. Supp. 905, 915 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (quoting United
States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 542 (1985)).
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